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The subject of this volume is a passage of approximately 90 lines from the
Nyāyamañjarī, a work of the classical Indian philosopher Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (fl.
9th c CE). The passage concerns the Buddhist theory of apoha (exclusion),
according to which concepts and word-meanings function by excluding what is
other than the intended content. Jayanta is not himself a Buddhist, and he
rejects the apoha theory, but in the passage in question he first presents the
objections to the theory raised by another opponent, Kumārila (8th c. CE), and
then gives responses to these objections attributable to the Buddhist thinkers
Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara. The volume consists of a new editing of the
passage, a translation, and a series of essays on the controversy over the apoha
theory.
Those not already familiar with the doctrine of apoha may well wonder why
an entire volume should be devoted to discussing the seemingly obvious point
that, e.g. the content of blue is determined by what remains when yellow, red,
green and the like have been excluded. The view is, after all, widely shared in
semantics that the extension of a kind term is determined through differentiation
from a contrast-class. Here is one way of understanding the significance of this
Buddhist theory. Buddhist epistemologists (members of the school of Dignāga)
claim that there are two basic ways of coming to have veridical cognitions:
directly, through perception, or indirectly, by inference. If I were seeking to
warm myself, I might come to know of a nearby fire by seeing its flames or
feeling its heat; or I might come to know of a distant fire I cannot perceive by
seeing smoke and recollecting that smoke is caused by fire. The second method
is indirect not only because it goes by way of the smoke that I directly cognize,
but also because what it makes me cognizant of is not the particular fire causing
the smoke, but an abstract ‘fire-in-general’. It is nothing peculiar to that distant
fire itself that brings about my cognition, but rather something that that fire
shares with all other fires: the universal fireness or ‘being fiery’. What I know
from seeing smoke is that there is something over there that is inhered in by
fireness
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At least this is a natural way to analyze the inferential cognition; it is how
members of the Nyāya school like Jayanta see things. And because for them the
distant fire really does have fireness in it, my inference can have as its object
precisely the particular fire that I would perceive were I closer. A universal such
as fireness is an ontologically queer thing, though: eternal, one but wholly
present in many distinct places simultaneously, apparently known only through
its instantiations, etc. Buddhists reject Nyāya’s realism about universals; they
are nominalists, holding that only momentary particulars are strictly speaking
real. The upshot is that what I conceive when I perform the inference from seen
smoke is not the same thing as what someone near that fire perceives. The
former is a conceptual construction, the latter a concrete particular.
The ontological scruples at work here create grave epistemological and
semantic difficulties for Buddhist epistemologists. If the object known by infer-
ence is a mere conceptual construction and not the concrete particular that
brings about real effects (such as the heat we feel), how can inference ever
lead to successful practice, like warming myself before that distant fire? For that
matter, when I see a fire in the distance, how can my cognition motivate me to
move in its direction in order to get warm? Such understanding requires that I
conceive what I now see as a case of fire, something that in my past experience
has been connected with perceiving warmth. This involves bringing the object of
my perception under a certain mode of conceptualization. And if there is
nothing like fireness in that concrete particular, how can this conceptualization
be justified?
The apoha theorist’s answer is that while there is no fireness in what I
perceive, this particular does share something with those other entities thought
of as cases of fire: not being non-fire. That is, the concept fire picks out all and
only those entities that are excluded by the class of instances of non-fire. One
will then want to know what it is in virtue of which the latter class is deter-
mined: if there is nothing positive that is shared by all instances of fire, what
could possibly make occurrences of water or earth count as cases of non-fire?
(This is what is known as the problem of circularity or mutual dependence.)
Dharmakīrti responds that water and the like count as non-fire precisely because
they fail to satisfy the desire for warmth. The point is that our taking the many
fires as sharing a common nature is the result of a particular set of interests. It is
because we humans have a need for warmth that we come to see the many
unique particulars as all alike in respect of being fiery. Their forming a kind
results from the construction of a concept that overlooks their mutual distinct-
ness in the interest of achieving cognitive economy, given our species-specific
needs. Nowadays we are accustomed to the scientific realist’s claim that there is
in nature nothing like the colors we think we see, that there are only different
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wavelengths of electromagnetic radiation. The Buddhist nominalist claim is
much more radical: Not only are there strictly speaking no colors, there are no
wavelengths of electromagnetic radiation either. There are only those distinct
events that are usefully thought of as being electromagnetic radiation of wave-
length x. And ‘usefully’ is to be understood as relative to creatures like us. All
conceptualization falsifies the ultimate nature of reality.
The Indian dispute over the apoha theory starts here. It is generally agreed
that if perception is to guide behavior, the perceived object must be seen as a
particular instance of a general kind. Seeing a pot won’t help solve the problem
of where to store the rice if what is seen is not seen as falling under the concept
pot. The realist Naiyāyika has no problem accounting for this. Given that the pot
is inhered in by potness, sensory contact with a pot gives rise first to perception
of the pot and then awareness of what is perceived as a pot, a member of the pot
kind. For Nyāya, the perceptual process has two stages: first an unconceptua-
lized bare awareness of the object, followed by a conceptual cognition whose
structure is: this as inhered in by potness. Both elements involved in this judg-
ment have recognized places in the Nyāya ontology: the pot as a substance,
potness as a universal. Dignāga and Dharmakīrti give superficially similar
accounts of the cognitive process. Seeing a pot, and having learned the conven-
tion for use of ‘pot’, one forms the judgment ‘This is a pot’. The difficulty is that
in place of a real potness, there is just the constructed ‘not non-pot’ to account
for the transition from the first state to the second. And since conceptual
constructions are not real, and the perceptual process requires real entities to
serve as causal relata, the object of perception can only be a mere this, a pure
particular. It cannot be a particular qualified by not being non-pot. In the eyes of
the realist, the apoha theory cannot explain the transition from the first to the
second stage of perceptual cognition. They cannot explain how perception can
guide behavior.
This is but one of the many difficulties posed by Jayanta in the first part of
the apoha passage from Nyāyamañjarī that is the subject of this volume. As the
excellent translation of Kei Kataoka and Alex Watson brings out, this part of the
passage proceeds on the assumption that the exclusions that are said to be
denoted by words must be somehow findable in the world as it is prior to our
conceptualization. If this were true, the problem might be solved. But an exclu-
sion is an absence, and absences require substrates. The not being non-cow is
what Naiyāyikas call a mutual absence (anyonyābhāva), the distinctness of
something from something else. As such, this distinctness must qualify some
entity or other. What, then, is the substrate of the absence of non-cow that is
said to be the meaning of ‘cow’? It cannot be the infinitely many particulars that
are cows, since meanings must be graspable by the finite minds of language
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users, and grasping an absence requires grasping its substrate. Nor can it be the
aggregate of those many particulars. Buddhists are mereological nihilists: They
deny the existence of aggregates as entities existing over and above their
constituents. And of course if it were the nature shared by all those things
that are cows, we would be back to positing universals like cowness. Other
problems are brought up as well. For instance, if the meaning of ‘cow’ is
determined by the extension of ‘non-cow’, and the meaning of ‘horse’ is deter-
mined by the extension of ‘non-horse’, then since these two extensions almost
completely overlap (horses make up just a tiny proportion of the infinitely many
things that are not cows, and vice versa), ‘cow’ and ‘horse’ should be near-
synonyms.
The second part of the Nyāyamañjarī passage gives Buddhist responses to
the objections raised in the first part. Jayanta’s Buddhist reply begins by reject-
ing the assumption that the relevant exclusions are findable in the world as it is
independently of our mental activity. Two alternatives are then mentioned. The
first is that what is called an exclusion is actually a mental image that functions
in such a way as to apply only to the entities not in the class of the excluded
entities. This may be understood as the inverse of Locke’s doctrine of abstract
ideas. Where Locke thought we arrive at a kind-concept like cow by forming an
image that abstracts away from the peculiarities of individual cows (white,
brindled, etc.) and retains only the common features (e.g. having a dewlap),
this view has the image formed by excluding the features of the non-cows. The
translators attribute this view to Dharmakīrti, although it may be argued that
this is mistaken. (As Kataoka points out in his essay (241), Dharmakīrti merely
identifies an exclusion as the act of excluding; the mental image view is,
however, clearly expressed by Śāntarakṣita). Jayanta’s Buddhist quickly rejects
this view in favor of a second possibility, that an apoha is neither something
mind-independent nor a mental image superimposed on extra-mental reality (is
‘neither without nor within’). This immediately raises the question how there
might be something that is neither extra-mental nor mental in nature, given that
any existent must be one or the other. If an exclusion is to be found neither in
the external world nor in the mind, what might it possibly be like?
Several contributors tackle this question. In her essay, Pascale Hugon inves-
tigates the following objection to Dharmottara’s view: If an apoha is not distinct
from the extra-mental reals it denotes, then conceptual cognition and perception
have the same object, contrary to Dignāga’s foundational tenet. Her defense of
the Buddhist view turns on the point that the notion of what is excluded by an
apoha is ambiguous: it might be understood as the real, causally efficacious
particulars involved in perception, or it might instead be taken as a pseudo-
particular that is conceptually constructed. Hugon takes the latter reading to be
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what the Buddhist intends, in which case the objection commits the fallacy of
equivocation. What this leaves unanswered, however, is why conceptual cogni-
tion should lead to successful practice if its object is a mere fabrication. Kataoka,
in his essay, has Dharmottara rejecting both the idea that an apoha is a mental
image, and that it is something superimposed on the real particulars. Instead it
is a mere fabrication. But here too the efficacy of conceptual cognition remains
unexplained. McAllister’s essay takes up the related question of how perceptual
judgments, such as ‘This is a pot’, are arrived at. (The reader who is not already
familiar with the apoha theory would do well to start with this essay, which
provides a succinct and eminently lucid account of the theory’s motivation and
its different formulations.) As McAllister sees it, for Dharmottara the object of a
perceptual judgment, the ‘a pot’, results from a process occurring over at least
two moments. While this may be important, it once again fails to explain how
something that is merely fabricated could play a role in fruitful conduct.
There is, though, a possibility that may have been overlooked here: that the
‘neither-nor’ at work in this claim that exclusions are ‘neither without nor
within’ is the same as the one at work in the classical Buddhist catuṣkoṭi or
tetralemma, where all four options are denied. In the tetralemma device, what
allows one to reject all four logical possibilities is that the negation used in their
rejection is non-implicative or verbally bound negation (prasajya pratiṣedha). To
reject a statement using this sort of negation is not to commit to there being any
positive characterization of the matter; it may instead be that the question at
issue is ill-formed. Given the illegitimacy of the question ‘What color is π?’, to
deny that π is green is not to commit to its being red or blue or yellow. That this
might be what is going on in the denial that exclusion is either extra-mental or
mental is hinted at when the Buddhist says that exclusion is not ultimately
(pāramārthikī) real. What this may suggest is that while the excluded entities are
deemed ultimately real, the conceptual construction that is an apoha is merely
conventionally real. This is how Dharmottara seems to have seen the matter: this
may be what he is getting at when he says that conceptualization is visible only
in a sequence of successive cognitions, not in the individual cognitions them-
selves. The point would then be that while the object of a perceptual cognition is
ultimately real, the object of inference or perceptual judgment is only conven-
tionally real (a ‘fabrication’), and so cannot be said to be ultimately identical
with or distinct from the ultimately real particulars. Since conventionally real
entities reductively supervene on entities that are ultimately real, the efficacy of
conceptual cognitions can be accounted for in terms of the causal powers of the
ultimately real particulars that are their supervenience base. And given semantic
insulation between the ultimate and conventional domains of discourse, the
problem of bringing the two kinds of object into relation (the problem exploited
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by the ‘neither identical nor distinct’ argument for mereological nihilism) is
avoided.
This volume contains, in addition to the translation and the essays by
Hugon, Kataoka and McAllister, four other essays. There is a piece by Hideyo
Ogawa on Dignāga’s understanding of the semantic relation between qualifier
and qualificand (as in the expression ‘blue lotus’), and its relation to the
semantic theory of the Grammarian Bhartṛhari. An essay by Kensho Okada
examines the early commentator Śākyabuddhi’s answer to the question whether
what is grasped in linguistic cognition is positive or negative in nature. Hisataka
Ishida’s essay examines the dedicatory verse of Dharmottara’s Apohaprakaraṇa,
finding in it some clues as to Dharmottara’s understanding of apoha. And a
piece by Elisa Freschi and Artemij Keidan investigates what Jayanta may have
understood by ‘meaning’. Like the other essays in the volume, each of these
expands our knowledge of this important chapter in Indian epistemology and
philosophy of language. But there are also some difficulties that it would be
remiss of a reviewer to not point out.
First there is the matter of symbols. Given the level of abstraction at which a
discussion of the apoha theory must operate, it is natural for an explicator to use
symbols to try to capture important relationships. But given that the same
symbols are already used in a variety of different ways in different disciplines,
it is important that they be carefully defined when first introduced. In the notes
to their translation, Kataoka and Watson explain their use of the arrow and
double arrow, which is useful given that these signs are used quite differently in
symbolic logic. Ogawa, on the other hand, does not explain how he uses (104)
the arrow (‘→’) and tilde (‘~’). From context it is clear that by the arrow he means
the denotation relation, but the tilde is ordinarily used to express sentential
negation, an operation that can only be performed on complete sentences. Given
that his ‘W’ and ‘M’ are meant to stand for ‘word’ and ‘meaning’ respectively, his
‘~W’ and ‘~M’ simply make no sense. The sentence ‘It is not the case that “pot”’
is meaningless. There is a related difficulty with Kataoka and Watson’s use of
the double arrow, which they introduce as signifying ‘the relation of contra-
diction between two things that are mutually opposed’ (36). While two entities
may be said to be mutually opposed, only statements may be contradictories.
Finally, Freschi and Keidan use both an arrow and a double arrow to indicate
what they call (without further explanation) ‘necessary links’ (281). While it is
not always easy to impose uniform usage across a group of scholars, doing so in
a matter like this can be important.
Ogawa’s essay also ends with the rather surprising claim that Dignāga’s
formulation of the apoha theory does not have the fault of circularity. As we saw
earlier, the circularity objection starts from the point that in order to know the
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referent of ‘cow’ one must be able to discern the non-cows, but to know which
are those, in turn, one must know which are the cows. Avoiding this fault is, of
course, a chief desideratum for any formulation of the apoha theory. But Ogawa
has not, as far as I was able to tell, explained how Dignāga avoids it. He tells us
that what is communicated by an utterance of ‘cow’ is the image of a cow (146).
Other contributors deny that Dignāga’s formulation of the theory involved
appeal to mental images, and it would have been helpful to see this disagree-
ment addressed somewhere. More importantly, though, it is not at all clear how
circularity is thereby avoided. Someone who hears an utterance of ‘cow’ has, we
are told, the right sort of image produced in them because ‘the word is not used
to convey other meanings … denoted by other words’ (146). So the image
produced is not one produced by ‘horse’ or ‘elephant’. But how does one
know that the image corresponding to ‘cow’ differs from that corresponding to
‘horse’? Is it that the images present themselves as intrinsically dissimilar, while
the images in the minds of speaker and hearer are intrinsically similar in the
case of a ‘cow’ utterance? But similarity and dissimilarity depend on there being
real universals, so this road is not open to the nominalist. Dharmakīrti is explicit
on there being no real resemblances among the ultimate particulars, and there is
no evidence that Dignāga thought otherwise. If resemblance is, as Dharmakīrti
suggests, itself a conceptual construction, then the seeming similarities and
dissimilarities among mental images cannot explain how perceptual judgments
can lead to successful conduct. When told to fetch a cow, how does one know
not to fetch a horse?
Freschi and Keidan begin their essay with a plea for greater openness on the
part of philologists toward current work in other disciplines. Their point is well
taken. Our understanding of classical Indian texts is often considerably
enhanced by collaborative investigations, with philologists working in concert
with scholars trained in relevant disciplines like philosophy, linguistics, logic
and the like. But then care must be taken to use relevant technical terminology
(not just symbols) in appropriate ways. For instance, there is a distinction to be
drawn between lexical items such as terms, on the one hand, and syntactically
complete statement-making sentences on the other. It is only the latter sorts of
linguistic entities that may be said to have truth-values and propositional con-
tent. Yet Freschi and Keidan appear to attribute truth-values and propositional
content to terms as well (268). The word ‘cow’ is neither true nor false, and its
utterance does not express a proposition. There is also a problem with their use
of the term ‘quality’ to translate guṇa. In discussing the term vṛtti or ‘occurrence’
they say that Jayanta took it ‘as the inherence holding, e.g. between a quality
and a set of individual quality-bearers’ (276). There are actually two problems
here. First, what they seem to have in mind is the relation between a universal
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(or ‘property’) and the many particular entities in which that universal inheres
(the property-bearers). For a Naiyāyika like Jayanta, this would include not only
the relation between cowness and the many individual cows, but also the
relation between whiteness and the many individual occurrences of white
color. The last of these is the sort of thing that Nyāya means by guṇa. The
guṇas are what metaphysicians nowadays call ‘tropes’ or property-particulars,
such as the white color that is in this page and only this page. But the relation
between a universal (e.g. whiteness) and a trope that is an instance is not the
same as the relation between a trope and the substance in which it inheres. Both
relations are called by the same name, ‘inherence’ (samavāya). But the white
color trope inhering in the substance that is this page is inhered in by whiteness.
The point Jayanta is making in the passage they are referring to (guṇaguṇinoś
ceyam eva vṛttiḥ) is not that a universal can inhere in many distinct individuals,
but that inherence holds between two things that are both found at the same
place but are nonetheless distinct entities. The white color trope is distinct from
the page in which it occurs, even though both are right here. Nyāya, unlike
Buddhism, has distinct categories for substance (dravya) and trope (guṇa).
In their examination of Jayanta’s understanding of linguistic meaning,
Freschi and Keidan make occasional reference to Frege’s distinction between
sense (Sinn) and reference (Bedeutung). It is helpful that the name of Gottlob
Frege (1848–1925) comes up in this context, since he is widely regarded as
central to the development of modern philosophy of language. The sense-refer-
ence distinction is clearly important to Freschi and Keidan’s project of acquitting
Jayanta (and Indian philosophy of language more generally) of the charge of
‘naïve referentialism’, the view that linguistic meaning is exhausted in reference.
This is valuable. But there is something else in Fregean semantics that might
have been of greater value, to Freschi and Keidan’s enterprise and to the work as
a whole. Frege is famous (or notorious) for having held that an adequate
account of linguistic meaning requires the positing of certain ‘third-realm’
entities, such as propositions. (In Frege’s semantics, a proposition is the sense
or mode of presentation of a sentence.) These entities are said to be ‘third-realm’
because Frege thought that while they must be held to exist, they could be
neither physical nor mental. The echo of Dharmottara’s claim that an apoha is
‘neither without nor within’ is clear. This is not to say that the apoha theory
anticipates Fregean semantics. For one thing, the Buddhist would condemn the
ontological profligacy of Frege’s posits. The point is rather that there may be a
deep pattern here that is worth exploring. Once we distinguish between the two
components of linguistic meaning that Frege labeled ‘sense’ and ‘reference’, we
are faced with the problem of explaining their relation. Frege’s third realm is
probably Plato’s heaven; Dharmottara’s ‘neither without nor within’ might be
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the realm of the conventionally real. Each of the competing ontologies behind
these choices of semantic theory has its own difficulties. What may be worth
pointing out to those who are skeptical of the value of the sort of philological
work on offer here, is how reading Jayanta on apoha can help bring to light deep
patterns in our theorizing about linguistic meaning. The work presented in this
volume is of value to a far wider audience than one might initially suspect.
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